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For the Poor, It was Just Friday: The Implicit Focus on Middle-class Habitus in
Conceptualizing Disaster

The importance of the academic study of disaster is in its potential application to policy and
practice in times of dire circumstance and human suffering. In this paper, we situate the Covid19 pandemic as an exemplar for an exploration of “disaster” using a framework that connects
sociological theory and critical disaster studies. We use a Bourdieusian approach to situate the
re-stabilization of the middle class habitus as implicitly central to disaster mitigation strategies.
This theoretical approach illuminates the disconnect between critical disaster studies and onthe-ground disaster recovery approaches. It is this disconnect that leads to the disparate impact
of disaster for the working and poverty classes. Through this analysis we suggest that policymakers must engage with this discrepancy by shifting focus from the middle-class normative
environment to the constant precarity of the working and poverty classes, either by centering
them in disaster recovery policy or (preferably) by ameliorating the disaster-like conditions of
the poverty class habitus overall.
Keywords: COVID-19, disaster, middle-class habitus, Bourdieu, disaster policy, poverty

Former president, Donald Trump, declared a state of emergency in the US on Friday, March 13,
2020 (Executive Office of the President 2020). Since that time, the Coronavirus pandemic
wreaked havoc with Americans’ everyday lives. This was nowhere more apparent than the
disruptions that occurred when bars and restaurants were shut down, prohibiting our intake of
cocktails and spirits. Changing the policy on to-go alcoholic drinks made the headlines as one of
the ways we could survive this disaster. Thirty-one states included cocktails-to-go as a temporary
relief measure at the beginning of the pandemic (half of these extended the law another 2-5 years
and the other half made it permanent (Kindy 2021). Why was ensuring that people could
continue to sip $12 Mojitos at home so critical to disaster policy efforts? In this paper we will
argue that to-go drinks, while seemingly superfluous, actually exemplify the normative focus on
middle-class habitus in COVID disaster relief and recovery efforts. To get back to ‘normal’
means to re-establish the middle-class stability that underlies American culture; conversely this
means sending some (the poor and working poor) back to the normal crisis of poverty.
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The importance of the academic study of disaster is in its potential application to policy and
practice in times of dire circumstance and human suffering. In this paper, we situate the Covid19 pandemic as an exemplar for an exploration of “disaster” using a framework that connects
sociological theory and critical disaster studies. We acknowledge that the timeframe of this
pandemic creates an extended fluidity, with multiple phases and outbreaks spanning vastly
different physical, social and political geographies. It is impossible to capture the true extent of
the impact of the pandemic and all of the nuanced moving pieces in a paper such as this. It is also
difficult to capture even a generalized American context as the disaster continues to unfold.
However, we are approaching this work as an opportunity to stretch the conceptualization of
disaster beyond the idea of a “short-lived” critical event. Even more critical is a call to demystify
the development of disaster recovery policy by adding transparency to the centrality of middleclass habitus and stability.

Background
Defining and Responding to Disaster
Most academic research focused on disaster in recent years specifically defines and evaluates
disaster as a social event rather than focusing on the physical event. This pattern begins in the
early (classical) theories and definitions of disaster, being at least some part of Fritz’s (1961)
definition and carried through in subsequent extensions of this definition (Perry 2018), and
includes work by Turner (1978), Quarantelli (2000), and Drabek and McEntire (2003). Tierney
(2019) describes this focus: “The severity of a disaster is measured not by the magnitude of the
physical forces involved, but rather by the magnitude of its societal impacts.”

2

The complication of defining disaster has been the work of successfully separating the concept of
disaster from “normalized” suffering. This is apparent in Fritz’s (1961) definition that focuses
primarily on the interruption of “essential services” as the definitive impact of disaster. Turner’s
(1978) definitional decision specifically separates the idea of the prior conditions from issues of
fairness or equity, thus successfully making the term “disaster” conceptually separate from
“everyday” social problems. In a largely accepted definition of disaster, Quarantelli (2000)
outlines five specific features of a disaster: 1) sudden onset of conditions; 2) routine disruption;
3) unplanned implementation of actions to minimize disruption; 4) impact on life histories; and
5) valued social objects are threatened. In 2005, Quarantelli added that existing vulnerabilities
pose increased risk during a disaster, which highlights “weaknesses in social structures or social
systems.”
These definitional turns are important insofar as they are examples of the theoretical acrobatics
necessary to disentangle the interruption of social order (described in outcomes like housing
stability or access to sufficient food and clean water) from those same outcomes impacting poor
and working class people with no precipitating event. In other words, these disaster definitions
pathologize only these impacts on classes of people who otherwise enjoy a certain degree of
stability in a given society as part of a disaster (middle and higher classes) and normalize these
same conditions for those in more precarious classes.
This issue has been taken up by critical disaster theorists. In their introductory chapter to their
book, Critical Disaster Studies, Horowitz and Remes (2021, 2-3) set out three core principles of
critical disaster studies: disasters are interpretive fictions, disasters are political, and disasters
take place over time. Hagen and Elliott (2021) offer two additional theses. First, they posit that
disaster is not purely disruptive and should be understood as a part of “social reality.” Second,
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they argue that “disasters are not pathological deviations from ‘normal’ so much as they are the
most salient manifestations of the ways that the normal is in fact pathological.” Our theoretical
approach to disaster in this paper is founded on these critical conceptualizations of disaster.
Much like the definitional process, disaster response policies are grounded in the normalization
of middle class needs and demands (Hastings & Matthews 2015). Phibbs et al.. (2018, 2)
describes this phenomenon, “If we understand disaster response as an extension of the policies
and dynamics that resulted in the uneven distribution of risk, the details of which are effectively
the minutiae of disaster construction, then the primary purpose of any response is to validate
those earlier responses.” They go on to state that, while the disruption of disaster offers an
opportunity to ask new questions, the design of disaster response leads necessarily to a
“normative reply.” Thus, our failure to define disaster in a way that includes the day to day
experiences of more “vulnerable” populations ensures that policies surrounding disaster will also
focus specifically on re-stabilizing the disruptions in the social order of the middle class.
Classed Habitus and Disaster
It is the classed aspect of disaster conceptualization combined with the power dynamics inherent
in the definitional process that invites a conversation with sociological theory. Bourdieu (1977,
86) refers to habitus as “a subjective but not individual system of internalized structures,
schemes of perception, conception, and action common to all members of the same group or
class.” This habitus (re)produces itself and its subjects through institutions, including the
healthcare, education, and government/legal systems (where we encounter the concerted efforts
to define disaster and ameliorate its effects). Institutions are tied to middle and upper class
habitus through the occupational structure, with middle-class and upper-class individuals
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inhabiting the key positions within institutional geographies. The working class and people
experiencing poverty are tied to these geographies tangentially, if at all. It is within these
institutional geographies that habitus is re(produced) in our interpretations of and approaches to
disaster. Thus, the centrality of the middle and upper class habitus in the definitional and solution
planning processes is guaranteed through these institutional ties.
The middle class experience has key characteristics including: professional careers/work, higher
levels of education, and home ownership. In addition, the stability of the middle class can be
described in terms of access to infrastructure services (like electricity, transportation, and
telecommunications), housing, health care (including mental health services), adequate food, and
safe water. This stability can also be seen in the social acceptance of key norms including
practices, values, and daily routines. These things considered together create a powerful middle
class habitus (Bourdieu 1984).
It is well documented, however, that the U.S. class structure has been growing increasingly
unequal. The middle class can be identified as a combination of income at or above the
household median and at least some higher education; this group was shrinking even before the
pandemic due to stagnating wages, an increase in the service sector and the rise of gig jobs with
low wages and no benefits, and tax cuts to the rich that have hollowed out social support. These
structural changes led to the rise of economic inequality in both income and wealth, benefitting
the top five percent of U.S. households at the expense of other classes. Income inequality has
been increasing since 1980, with families at the top experiencing greater gains than all other
classes. Wealth inequality is even greater; between 2001-2016 middle class median net worth
shrunk by 20%, lower-income by 45% but upper-income households increased by 33% (Pew
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Research 2020). Thus, even the middle-class may not be able to participate in a middle-class
habitus.
However, this habitus is accepted as “legitimate” and forms the basis of structural expectations.
The legitimacy of this habitus is dependent on its characteristic consumerism, which is required
to maintain the habitus of the elite. Weininger (2005) explains the relationship between this
legitimacy and the state or governing structure: “When classificatory schemes are simultaneously
sedimented into dispositions and inscribed into the order of things (i.e. into discourse,
institutions, and law), a “complicity” can develop between habitus and world which is
profoundly recalcitrant to change.” In regards to the disruption of disaster, the distance between
the normative middle class habitus and the requirements of the disaster environment renders that
habitus ineffective (Weininger 2005). This phenomenon provides the necessary backdrop to
understanding how middle class stability becomes the litmus paper by which disaster is socially
constructed, disaster policies are developed, and successful recovery outcomes are measured. By
labeling disruptions of middle-class habitus as ‘disaster’ we silently normalize everyday
disruptions of the working class and poor.
Other Vulnerabilities
While our focus in this paper is a class-based approach to disaster, we acknowledge that
consideration of other areas of inequality is especially important in disaster research. For
example, we know that women and men are impacted differently by disaster, especially in
relation to the existing gendered division of labor. In the context of disaster, women are often the
ones performing emotional labor, including creating a sense of normalcy for children and
navigating systems to ensure access to daily living necessities (like food and water) for families.
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Additionally, while women make up a significant portion of those volunteering in impacted
communities, they are largely missing from the positions and locations of power where disaster
planning occurs (Enarson, Fothergill, and Peek 2007).
The importance of intersectional analyses is apparent in the existing disaster literature. Many of
the studies included in Benevolenza and DeRigne’s (2019) review of impacts of disasters on
vulnerable populations included some type of intersectional analysis focusing on groups with
multiple connections to inequality. Fordham (2008) discusses intersectional analyses of disaster
and concludes that “a sensitivity to difference is required.” One example of this sensitivity is
found in her discussion of age, class, and gender: “An elderly middle-class woman on her own in
an isolated location, even if she has financial resources and insurance, is potentially as vulnerable
and in need of help as a woman in a large working-class community without those resources but
who has access to social networks.”
Often, disaster research focuses on the differential impact of disaster on populations defined as
“vulnerable” (Blaikie, et.al 1994; Tierney 2019). This approach is grounded in an attempt to
draw attention to the disproportionate impact of disaster on people who may not have the
necessary resources to easily or successfully navigate the impact of disaster. We would suggest
that, while much of the research on disaster focuses on these vulnerable populations, this has not
translated to recovery processes and policies, which continue to focus on re-stabilization of the
middle class. The institutionalization of recovery policies are manifestations of society’s need to
keep “suffering in its place” (Remes 2019).
As an example, Fordham (2008) extrapolates the differences between middle and working class
experiences of flooding in Scotland in 1993-1995. She found that the middle class were less
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vulnerable to negative outcomes because they had resources available that allowed them to
exercise choice and control. However, the highly valued individualism within the middle class
can increase vulnerability. Whereas working class groups exhibited stronger community links
and networks and familiarity with existing agencies already working in those communities.
Disaster responses that included relocation disrupted those ties. In this example, we can clearly
see that the precarity of everyday life resulted in community and kinship ties that could
potentially mediate the negative repercussions of disaster among working class people. However,
the individualism associated with the middle class experience was the normative habitus,
resulting in disaster recovery practices and policies that undermined the resilience present within
the working class communities.
Similarly to Fordham, sociologist Alice Fothergill (2004) found that disaster recovery policy can
destabilize working class communities. Respondents in Fothergill’s research on the Grand Forks
Flood of 1987 who sought to buy older homes in the downtown area with the Small Business
Assistance (SBA) financing, were told those homes were not allowed coverage under the
program. Instead they were forced to buy newer suburban homes, leaving many working-class
respondents “house poor” and socially isolated from their neighbors.
In fact, restoring homeowners’ property (regardless of the outcome) is a primary aim of disaster
recovery efforts. Homeownership is a hallmark of middle-class stability and much of federal
disaster funding goes to homeowners to rebuild property. After Superstorm Sandy, for example,
renters experienced 43% of the damage but were initially targeted to receive only 22% of federal
funding (University of Pennsylvania 2019). Even programs that allow for rental assistance still
favor homeowners. The Individual and Households Program (IHP) administered by FEMA does
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allot money to renters for funding for temporary rental or lodging assistance, but for owners it
provides funding for permanent housing repairs and construction or home replacement
(Department of Homeland Security 2021). After funds run out for renters, finding permanent
homes or secure lodging is difficult. Even in normal times, though, many working class and poor
renters have difficulty keeping up with rent payments and often face instability in securing
housing (Desmond 2016), experiences that are comparable to disaster victims. However, only
after the government formally declares social life a disaster is assistance more readily available
through programs such as FEMA’s IHP.
We are focusing our attention on the point of tension created by this existing literature. It is
telling that, while vulnerable populations are studied widely in post-disaster impact research,
these findings are not foundational to the development of policies designed in response to
disasters. This phenomenon highlights the centrality of middle class habitus in these processes.
Using Covid-19 as an exemplar disaster, we suggest that by using the theory of habitus, we can
evaluate the ways that class dominates the definitional processes and development of disaster
response policies. Second, we hope to highlight the disconnect between recovery policies
(focusing specifically on the stabilization of the middle class habitus) and disaster research
(focusing primarily on the impact to already-vulnerable populations). Finally, we illustrate the
impact of this disconnect on vulnerable populations.

Covid-19: An Exemplar
Precipitating Event and Widespread Disruption of Norms
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The virus we now know as Covid-19 was first identified from an outbreak of novel human
pneumonia in Wuhan City, China beginning in December 2019 (Liu, Kuo, & Shih 2020).On
March 11, 2020, the WHO officially recognized COVID-19 as a pandemic (Liu, Kuo, & Shih
2020). The primary route of interhuman transmission of COVID-19 is air-born transmission (dos
Santos 2020). At the time of the writing of this paper, globally there have been more than 476
million confirmed cases, nearly 6.1 million deaths, and nearly 11 billion vaccine doses
administered (World Health Organization 2022). In the United States there have been more than
79 million cases and nearly a million deaths (World Health Organization 2022).
Since SARS-CoV-2 proved to be an airborne virus, preventing people from being in close
contact to transmit the virus required widespread “lockdowns.” Focusing on the U.S. context,
these lockdown measures began in March 2020 and included prohibitions on travel from outside
of the United States, closings of “non-essential” businesses/services, stay-at-home orders, and
mandates prohibiting gatherings of large groups. Following these “lockdown” measures,
individual behavioral recommendations were made, including: mask-wearing, staying at home,
maintaining at least 6 feet distance between people in public spaces, cleaning/disinfecting hightouch areas regularly, daily health monitoring, avoiding large gatherings, and later - vaccinations
(CDC 2022).
These measures, many of which were also instituted across the globe, resulted in a global
disruption in economic and social systems and constituted a disruption of norms. From the
normative activities of going to work each day to spending time with friends and family, these
changes threw the U.S. social system into disarray generally. Businesses across the United States
clamored to figure out how to maintain productivity with a largely absent workforce. While
various groups were impacted in different ways, vast numbers of people lost jobs, left the
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workforce, lost hours/income, or moved to telework. Between March and September 2020, 2.6
million women and 1.7 million men left the workforce (Hsu 2020). Between May and July 2020
tens of millions of workers reported being unable to work at some point in the previous four
weeks because their employer closed or lost business due to Covid-19 (49.8 million in May; 40.4
million in June; and 31.3 million in July). In addition to job losses, telework increased
substantially across many industries throughout the year. In May 2020, 48.7 million people
(constituting about 35% of the employed workforce) worked from home within the last four
weeks. By December 2020 this number had decreased, but remained high at 24% of the
employed workforce (35.5 million workers) (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2021). As of this writing
in 2022, Facebook is just now bringing its workers back into the office.
Working from home became the popular response for the non-essential workplace. Schools were
forced to move online, making home the new classroom. At the same time, schools and colleges
throughout the country moved to online platforms. The U.S. Census Bureau reported, in August
2020, that nearly 93% of households with school-age children reported some form of “distance
learning”. Approximately 61% of daycare businesses have been closed at some point during the
pandemic. While in-home daycare providers were able to bounce back a bit more quickly, longterm impacts are expected (Vesoulis 2020).
Retail stores and restaurants found it necessary to create or optimize online shopping with
curbside pickup or delivery options.At the start of the pandemic, approximately 180,000
businesses indicated that they had closed (permanently or temporarily). By August 2020, that
number was down to around 163,735: however, that number actually represented a 23% increase
since July 2020. Hardest hit were restaurants (especially breakfast/brunch, Mexican, and
sandwich shops), bars/nightlife venues, fitness locations, and beauty businesses (Yelp 2020). In
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stores that did remain open, consumers were surprised throughout 2020 at the number of items
that were absent or difficult to find. The pandemic disrupted supply chains at various points
globally resulting in shortages of: computer chips, lumber, toilet paper and other paper products,
aluminum cans, appliances, beans and grains, canned and frozen vegetables, over-the counter
medications, and meat (Kaplan & Kay 2021; Matarese 2020).
Other institutions such as nursing homes, hospitals, and jails/prisons were disrupted. As the
pandemic surged, hospitals were forced to create physical space for the high numbers of Covid19 patients, canceling other appointments and procedures. Small businesses closed their doors,
often eventually failing completely. Many people were left without income or were forced onto
unemployment benefits. The fact that no one knew how long these measures would remain intact
increased uncertainty and instability, undermining the middle-class habitus.
Disaster Plans as Approaches to Regain Equilibrium for Middle Class
Disaster preparedness plans focus first and foremost on critical health concerns, preservation of
life, and emergency health services. Most also include maintenance or replacement of the
following “necessary” services and resources: shelter, food, potable water, electricity, natural
gas, transportation, and telecommunications (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2019;
U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2019). Organizations whose services include disaster
relief (i.e. Federal Emergency Management Agency and the Red Cross) also focus on these
systems. These infrastructure elements are considered “essential” in disaster response, but are
often unattainable or unstable outside of disaster circumstances for those experiencing poverty.
In other words, these elements are only deemed “essential” when those classes of people who
have stable access to these resources have that access interrupted by an outside force. This
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exemplifies the ways in which both the definition of and response to disaster is based on the
normative stability of the middle class. Furthermore, recent research highlights the ways in
which disaster response can contribute to maintaining and increasing inequality (Hagen & Elliott
2021).
The disaster recovery plans created in response to Covid-19 were multi-faceted. They included
efforts to halt the spread of the pandemic, efforts to mitigate the economic impact, and attempts
to build/maintain infrastructure. These policies are occurring at multiple levels: federal, state,
local, and individual. Some of the mitigation strategies are part of the disorder (stay at home
orders and business closures), while others attempt to minimize the negative impact of those
mitigation strategies. It is the latter where we predominantly see the effort to stabilize the middle
class habitus, which, in turn, supports the capitalist (elite) habitus.
The elite class in the United States has profited from our recovery and mitigation efforts. From
online shopping platforms to moguls in the pharmaceutical industry, the elite have increased
their wealth. Since 2020, the wealth of billionaires has increased by about one-trillion dollars
(about a 35% increase). The number of billionaires in the U.S. has also grown, adding nearly 100
new billionaires (Peterson-Withorn 2021).
While state and local efforts are more specific, they are also more varied and extend beyond the
scope of this article. We will focus predominantly on the health-based recommendations and
federal policies that have been enacted as they represent a standard national response. We look
specifically at the CDC guidelines and the six federal level legislative packages that have been
passed in response to the Covid-19 pandemic: Coronavirus Preparedness and Response
Supplemental Appropriations Act, Families First Coronavirus Response Act, CARES Act,
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Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act, Consolidated Appropriations
Act, and American Rescue Plan.
Some of the CDC recommendations for minimizing the spread of Covid-19 included stay-athome orders, closure of non-essential businesses and agencies, social distancing/masking,
cleaning/disinfecting of high-touch areas, masking, and vaccination. All of these interrupt the
normative environment. However, they impact middle class and poor families differently. As
mentioned previously, low-wage workers were disproportionately represented among those
industries deemed essential, requiring them to continue working. Conversely, they were also
most critically impacted by job losses in the restaurant and service industries. These mitigation
efforts increased the vulnerability of poor and working class workers compared to middle and
upper class workers. Not surprisingly, then, Jung, Manley, and Shrestha (2021) found that stayat-home orders and other social distancing mandates, while effective for communities with lower
levels of poverty, were not effective in communities with higher levels of poverty.
One policy that did help people from lower classes socially distance was the eviction
moratorium. Prior to the pandemic, evictions for the working and lower classes were a normal
part of their social experience. The eviction moratorium was designed to keep people in their
homes to discourage public interactions in shelters and on the streets, as well as to allow for
more time to raise the vaccination rate. Congress enacted a moratorium from March 2020 to July
2020 in the Cares Act Legislation and after that expired, the Centers for Disease Control issued
orders to halt evictions under the Public Health Service Act starting in the Fall of 2020. Unlike
the CARES Act, though, the CDC order only covered federally subsidized housing or properties
with federally backed mortgages. These policies, however, were successful in keeping rates
down; one study found that during the interim between the two bans, the rate of COVID cases
14

and especially mortality increased (Leifheit, et al.. 2021). With pressure from red state
governments, the Supreme Court lifted the ban in August 2021 and since then evictions have
continued apace.
Another approach to ending the pandemic was vaccinations. Studies have shown that there are
disparities in vaccination rates, with BIPoC and poor people having lower rates of vaccination.
Vaccine deserts have been identified and largely exist in poor and non-white areas (Williams et
al. 2021; Lu, Gondi, & Martin 2021). Testing, especially early in the pandemic, was spotty in
poor communities, compared to middle-class (especially white) neighborhoods (Servick 2020).
Even after testing became more widely available, some with lower incomes avoided testing for a
variety of reasons. People have reported making this decision at times to avoid school closures
and mandated requirements to quarantine from workplaces (Rubin 2020).
One of the components of the federal Covid-19 legislation has been the stimulus checks for
individuals. There have been several stimulus check releases throughout 2020 and 2021. Unlike
most federal and state cash benefit programs, these included families with higher annual incomes
(up to nearly $200,000 in some cases). Means testing required no additional verification outside
of information the Internal Revenue Service already had on file. People who do not regularly file
taxes (adults with disabilities who receive Supplemental Security Income or people with very
low or no income) were required to file additional paperwork to access their stimulus checks.
Looking specifically at the first disbursement of stimulus payments, people with incomes of less
than $50,000 were more likely to use these payments for expenses, while those with higher
incomes more often reported using the payments for savings or debt reduction. While higher
income families and individuals did not qualify for these payments, it is important to note that
households with incomes of less that $25,000 were more likely than other incomes between
15

$25,001 and $99,000 to report that they had not received or did not expect to receive a stimulus
payment. This was largely attributed to the confusion surrounding the additional steps required
for non-filers (Schild, Garner, and Safir 2020). This highlights the ways in which the stimulus
payments benefited middle income households very differently from lower income households.
Workplace policies included within the federal legislation includes programs like: emergency
family and medical leave, emergency paid sick leave, paycheck protection, increased and
extended unemployment benefits, Economic Injury Disaster Loan advance payments, small
business loans, and money to mitigate the loss of revenue for restaurants, bars and other
food/drink all protect the middle class habitus. They ensure that people still have access to pay
when they are ill, caring for an ill family member, or unemployed due to Covid-19. Support for
businesses helps re-establish access to goods and services expected by middle-class families.
Legislation also focused on the restoration of the supply chain for household products and food
that were damaged during Covid-19. This restored (to some extent) not only the consumption
supply chain but also consumer choice. Localities and businesses have found new ways to
continue their services despite the pandemic. Many stores have increased their curbside pick-up
or delivery services. Thirty-nine states have changed laws and regulations to allow for to-go
alcoholic beverages (Price 2020). Many states lifted restrictions early, which functioned as a way
to protect consumption in those states (Armus et al. 2020).
Ending Disaster Policies that Helped the Poor
Writing on the downslope of Omicron actually allowed us to witness how policies that helped
the poor were removed in order to restabilize the pre-pandemic status quo. The lifting of the ban
on eviction moratorium discussed above was just one example of the push to get back to middle
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class ‘normal’. Another example is the fate of the Earned Income Tax Credit. During the
COVID pandemic, Congress authorized monthly payments to households with children under 18
using advances on the Earned Income Tax Credit. Economists estimate these payments of $250$300 per child kept 3.7 million children out of poverty in December 2021, did not depress
parents’ employment, and did not add to the budget deficit as it was money already included in
tax relief. However, Congress failed to renew this program as part of Build Back Better plan for
the 2022 budget, and by January 2022 3.7 million children were back in poverty and their
families were struggling even more under the weight of increased inflation (McCammon, et.al
2022). While it would have been relatively painless to extend this policy to continue to support
these children, Congress dropped the policy after the pandemic disaster ‘crisis’ was declared
over and returned these households back to the normal (disaster) of poverty.
An important federal policy response to the employment disruption of the disaster was the
Federal Pandemic Unemployment Compensation program, which increased unemployment
payments by $300 a week. Of course this policy did not help non-waged workers, but did support
those working people who were unable to keep their jobs due to shutdowns and/or could not
work from home. These additional payments were associated with improved outcomes in food
insecurity, mental health, and access to health care to those receiving benefits (Berkowitz and
Basu 2021).
However, when businesses had difficulty filling low-wage positions, red-state legislatures and
businesses argued (without any detailed evidence) that this additional unemployment income
kept people from filling jobs and thus clamored for the federal government to stop these
additional payments. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce in May of 2021 stated:
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The disappointing jobs report makes it clear that paying people not to work is dampening what
should be a stronger jobs market. We need a comprehensive approach to dealing with our
workforce issues and the very real threat that these unfilled positions poses to our economic
recovery from the pandemic. One step policymakers should take now is ending the $300 weekly
supplemental unemployment benefit. Based on the Chamber’s analysis, the $300 benefit results
in approximately one in four recipients taking home more in unemployment than they earned
working (US Chamber of Commerce 2021).
These policymakers and business leaders wanted a return to the status quo where workers would
return to their low-waged jobs to support the continued consumption of the middle-class and the
continued profit-making of owners and executives; the Biden administration ended the plan
entirely in September 2021.
In the latest development at the time of this writing, federal funds for free COVID testing and
vaccinations, which allowed low income and poor residents access to important health services
to treat individual health and community spread, are being eliminated.. Now that rates of
infection are low and most of the US is loosening social distancing and masking mandates, the
political will to cover these important services is waning. In late March 2022 and early April,
The Health Resources and Services Administration stopped accepting claims for testing,
treatment, and vaccination claims through the COVID-19 Uninsured Program and the COVID19 Overage Assistance fund due to lack of sufficient funds.
For the poor, then, the end of these disaster policies is a return to the normal disruption of lack of
health care, low wage, high risk jobs, and lack of affordable housing. For the middle and upper
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classes, their ability to obtain to-go cocktails (in addition to retaining jobs and houses) has been
restored.
Impact on Vulnerable Populations
For those not solidly in the middle class (and who are considered “vulnerable” from the
perspective of the social vulnerability frame), the pandemic reinforced already existing
inequalities. Using an intersectional lens, we know that economic inequality is more likely to
include BIPoC, women (especially single mothers), people with disabilities (PWD) and chronic
health conditions, institutionalized people (including nursing homes and jails/prisons), the
LGBTQIA+ community, and poor/working class people, who all experienced precarity prior to
the pandemic but this insecurity intensified during the pandemic in terms of morbidity,
unemployment, instability in housing, and increasing levels of poverty.1
Covid-19 Infections, morbidity, and deaths
The most prevalent issue for “the vulnerable” was the increased risk of illness and death
associated with many of these groups including Black, Indigenous, People of Color (BIPoC)
communities, people with disabilities, poor people, and institutionalized populations. Even
during “non-disaster” times, well-documented health disparities exist for these groups: they have
less access to adequate or quality healthcare services; have higher rates of existing chronic health
conditions and risk factors; and have less access to other health protective resources. Essential

This article uses Covid-19 as an example for the re-framing of disaster mitigation and recovery
policies within a Bourdieusian theoretical context that highlights the implicit focus of these
policies on restoration of middle-class habitus, rather than interrupting the precarity and
suffering of marginalized groups that has been normalized within and outside disaster situations.
For a more nuanced look at the disparate impact of Covid-19 on marginalized populations, we
urge readers to read the work of scholars who have focused specifically on these disparities.
1
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workers, especially people of color, experienced higher rates of COVID infection and death due
in large part to these occupational risks (Do and Frank 2021). But even in normal times, people
in the working class and BIPOC communities already experience negative health outcomes visa-vis the (white) middle class.
Research shows that people of color have experienced a higher risk of exposure, higher rates of
positivity when tested, and require higher levels of care. Additionally, they have been shown to
be more likely to die from Covid-19 than whites, even when other social factors (like
socioeconomic status) were controlled for (Rubin-Miller et al.. 2020). People with intellectual
disabilities were more likely to contract Covid-19, more likely to be admitted to the hospital and
more likely to die following an admission compared to patients without intellectual disabilities
(Gleason et al.. 2021).
Poverty and income have a potentially complicated relationship with Covid-19 spread and
deaths. Jung, Manley, and Shrestha (2021) found that Covid-19 infections in the U.S. initially
began in high-income counties (associated with international travel). In the following weeks, it
spread rapidly to low-income counties, likely due to the employment of people from poor
communities in the service economy serving higher income counties. Eventually a U-shaped
curve emerged with low-income and high-income communities having higher rates of infection.
Higher rates of infection are found in high-income communities that also have high population
density, but low population density does not offer the same buffer for poor communities.
Additionally, poor communities have the highest levels of deaths from Covid-19. It is likely that
the primary drivers of this phenomenon are the existing disparities in pre-existing conditions,
access to adequate health care services, and resource access.
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Institutionalized populations also had higher risks related to Covid-19. These populations include
people living in nursing homes, assisted living facilities, rehabilitation or other long-term
hospitalizations, and jails/prisons. One important factor for all of these groups is that their living
arrangements necessarily require that they be in contact with a large number of people on a
regular basis. Their particular risk may be related to which type of institution they live in. For
instance, prisoners already have high levels of health risks, including cardiac and respiratory
illnesses. They also have a high level of illnesses like hepatitis. Elderly people living in nursing
home settings are most often already experiencing illness and frail health and have compromised
immune systems. Other people living in these types of facilities include people with acute mental
illness, and people with high levels of physical or intellectual disabilities. People in these groups
often have conditions that impact their ability to fully participate in or understand recommended
safety measures. They often also suffer from high-risk health conditions. These health concerns
have been exacerbated throughout the Covid-19 pandemic with outbreaks throughout these
institutionalized populations. Available research suggests that the Covid-19 case rate for
prisoners (state and federal prisons) was 5.5 times higher than that of the general population, and
the crude death rate for prisoners was also substantially higher (Saloner et al.. 2020). As of June
2021, the New York Times reported that 4% of all cases and 31% of deaths nationally had
occurred in nursing homes.
As previously mentioned, occupational patterns have proven to be a significant driver of Covid19 spread. Retail, food service, and health care workers, deemed ‘essential’ by the Department of
Homeland Security in March 2020 (Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency 2020), were
forced to continue working while many professional and technical positions were allowed to
work from home. The work of people in food service, especially meatpacking and many retail
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grocery workers, actually served to restore some stability for middle class folks to maintain their
consumption of food. Counties with meatpacking plants, which employ many immigrants and
are already some of the most dangerous workplaces, had COVID prevalence rates of 10 times
other rural counties in March and April of 2020 (United States Department of Agriculture 2021).
Grocery store retail workers were deemed essential and required to go to work, all the while
putting their lives at risk and in the process creating record profits for stores. One study found
that grocery store employees who had direct contact with customers such as clerks were five
times more likely to test positive for COVID-19 and more likely to report depression and anxiety
.Stores issued hazard pay, but the amounts varied wildly; some workers earned $2.58 more an
hour on average at stores like Target but only 95 cents an hour on average more at Amazon and
63 cents an hour at Walmart. Women and people of color are overrepresented in these jobs
(Kinder, Stateler, & Du 2020).
Another important factor associated with increased inequality during Covid-19 has been the high
levels of unemployment associated with closures and losses. According to the Congressional
Research Service (2021), in April 2020, unemployment in the US reached 14.8%, the highest
recorded rate. While some recovery has happened, by May 2021, aggregate employment was 7.3
million jobs below the pre-recession level. Various occupational sectors were differentially
impacted with leisure/hospitality experiencing the largest number of job losses and highest levels
of unemployment. In April 2020, the unemployment rate was nearly 40% in this sector. In May
2021, the rate remained the highest in this sector, at over 10%. It has also been found that within
individual sectors, low-wage workers were disproportionately represented among those who had
lost jobs (Bartik et al.. 2020). Persons identifying as Black or Hispanic, younger workers, and
those with lower levels of education experienced higher unemployment rates and lower labor
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participation throughout the pandemic. Unemployment peaked for white and Asian workers in
April 2020, but continued to rise for Black workers through May 2020 (peaking at 16.7%)
(Congressional Research Service 2021). In May 2021, Black unemployment remained higher
than all other race/ethnic groups (9.1%). Hispanic workers (of all racial groups) had an
unemployment peak of 18.5%.
Much of the existing research has focused on the impact of the pandemic on women specifically.
As professional work largely moved to telecommuting, schools and daycares closed. Home
became the space in which work, family, and education occurred simultaneously. It has been
well documented that women perform more unpaid household labor than men, creating a huge
impact on women. The pandemic brought these gender issues to the forefront as women
attempted to juggle these responsibilities. Thirty-nine percent of women with children under the
age of 18 in the household reported that it has been more difficult to juggle these multiple
responsibilities (compared to only 28% of men) (Parker, Horowitz, & Minkin 2020). Fifty-seven
percent of mothers report that their mental health has been worse during the pandemic (compared
to 32% of fathers) (Hamel and Salganicoff 2020). Over the course of the pandemic, women
often found it necessary to reduce hours, take time off, or leave the workforce completely (Gogoi
2021). Between February and April 2020, women lost more than 12.2 million jobs (National
Women’s Law Center 2021). The brunt of women’s job and income loss has been borne by
Black and Latina women (National Women’s Law Center 2021).
Some research showed that men in these households initially increased the number of hours
spent on household labor (Carlson, Petts, & Pepin 2020; Shafer et al.. 2020). Later, however, it
seems that this novelty wore off and men returned to their pre-pandemic levels of household
labor (Topping and Duncan 2020). For working class women, there were additional issues. Most
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lower-paid work is not conducive to telecommuting (as mentioned previously), resulting in
workers who had to continue going to work, risking exposure or hour reduction/job losses, and
exacerbated by a lack of available childcare. However, across the board, women are often the
ones who procure important resources for families, which was made more difficult throughout
the pandemic.
Conclusion
Horowitz and Remes argue that often the best approach scholars of disaster can take is “to
understand the politics and experiences of people who are most at risk and to join their efforts to
build more just, equal, and safe communities (2021, 4).” In this paper we attempt to center the
perspectives of the economically marginalized in COVID response policies in the U.S. We have
argued that conceptions of disaster, including definitions, responses, and even who is making
these decisions, must be critically interrogated. We have made a case that disaster response
policies are designed to privilege middle-class habitus and experience, and to normalize and
exacerbate the inequalities that marginalized populations experience every day. The reality of
disaster is that we, as a society, have long ago accepted the widespread precarity experienced by
the poverty class as normal. It is the disruption of the middle class habitus (and resultant
potential interruption of the economic gains associated with their consumerism for the elite class)
that offends us and drives the classification of and recovery from disaster.
While the focus on middle class stabilization is implicit, often going unnoticed by those in the
middle or elite classes, the working and poverty classes can see that recovery policies are not
designed for them. Their positionality within a system of inequality offers a specific standpoint
from which to view disaster policy. In the case of Covid 19, those in the working and poverty
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classes were more likely to be deemed an essential worker, requiring them to enter spaces of
possible contagion regularly, increasing their risk of potentially lethal consequences. These same
groups have less attachment to institutions like higher education, healthcare, and government.
This lack of attachment is tied to lack of access to, the prevalence of gatekeeping by, and a
history of exploitation from these institutions. It is no wonder that it is these groups who have
resisted protocols like vaccinations, masking, social distancing, and widespread closure
mandates. This is illustrative of how disaster cannot be successfully mitigated by continuing to
focus solely on the stabilization of the middle-class habitus. At the most basic level, policy
makers must take direction from critical disaster scholars to decenter the middle-class from
disaster recovery. At the highest level, relevant bodies should shift focus to policy and legislation
that level the playing field prior to what is considered to be a disaster, ameliorating the disasterequivalent conditions under which the working and poverty classes struggle every day.
Since the declaration of Covid-19 as a disaster on March 13, 2020, the pandemic has, with its
long-lasting presence (more than two years at time of the submission of this paper) offered an
opportunity for critical examination. More specifically, it has allowed us to identify the
disruption of primarily middle class norms highlighted by stability, routine, and continued
consumption. Middle class work routines are based on predictability: a work week that is
standardized; supports in place such as physical infrastructure (transportation, housing) to
facilitate the transition from work to home; and receiving a steady paycheck. Middle class
habitus also includes the consumption of goods and services on demand for payment. This
includes access to wide varieties of foods and other goods as well as non-emergency, in-person,
and elective health and mental health services. Most importantly, the stability of the middle class
habitus allows for the expectation that one can plan for the short- and long-term for one’s self
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and family. In other words, life is predictable, one is in control of one’s time and future. This
structured reliability of the middle-class habitus is also essential to ensuring the continued
economic growth of the elite. Throughout the pandemic each of these measures of middle-class
stability was impacted and destabilized, and the mitigation and recovery strategies centered on
restoring these services.
At the same time, the pandemic has, in some ways, exacerbated the precarity which is part of the
working-class and poverty-class habitus. In other ways, some of the mitigation strategies have
offered a taste of that stability that the middle-class enjoy in “non-disaster” times. Extended
unemployment benefits, eviction protection, and stimulus payments allowed a modicum of relief
from a few of the daily struggles of some in the working- and poverty-classes. However, these
strategies have started to dissipate as the middle-class habitus has been largely restored. While
the middle class were targeted by recovery policies, the pandemic became a financial boon for
the elite. For the poor and working-class, it was just Friday.
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